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I . INTRODUCTION
Security threats and countermeasures are well identified
for stand-alone computer system assets. Rapid technology
advances, however, have changed the form and extent of
connectivity between computer systems and enhanced the use of
distributed architectures (Buchanan and Linowes, 1980)
.
Distributed computer systems face the same potential threats
as stand-alone systems plus additional threats stemming from
their unigue characteristics. Reasons for the increased
security exposure may include: (Johnson and Layne, 1987;
Muftic, 1989)
• Geographic dispersion of computer system assets
• Several organizations and management involved in a single
network
• Central control is difficult
• Dissimilar computers and operating systems
• More entities involved
• Security exposure over a broader range of levels
A comprehensive examination of threats to such systems,
including those threats stemming from system connectivity is
essential to any security plan. (Pfleeger, 1989)
The main objective of any security plan is to operate
systems at an acceptable level of risk. The scope of a
security program should be commensurate with the value of the
assets requiring protection. Typical grouping of these assets
are hardware, software, data, personnel, documentation and
supplies. A more extensive list of possible assets is
provided in Appendix A and will be further discussed in
Chapter III.
Distributed system security employs management implemented
countermeasures to ensure the protection of assets in a
distributed environment. It provides assurances that the
distributed system performs critical functions correctly.
While security goals for stand-alone systems are well known,
the goals unique to distributed systems are more complex and
difficult to identify (IBM, 1987; Branstad, 1987). These
goals include system integrity, connection confidentiality,
originator/recipient nonrepudiation, access control, and
denial of service. (COMNAVDAC, 1991; Stallings, 1990)
System Integrity . System integrity provides for the
integrity of all user data on all connections. It can be
further broken down into three subcategories. The first
involves the routing of data where data transmitted from any
point in a network is received at the intended destination and
nowhere else. The second involves the protection of data
itself where the data received at any point in a distributed
system is exactly the same in content as the data transmitted.
It allows for the determination of whether the data has been
modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed. Thirdly, it
guarantees that information, while in transit, cannot be
observed, tampered with, or extracted from the distributed




confidentiality of all user data on a connection.
Originator/Recipient Nonrepudiation . Another goal of
distributed system security is to assure nonrepudiation. It
provides the sender of data with proof of data delivery to
protect against any attempt by the recipient to deny receiving
the data. It also provides the data recipient with proof of
data origin to protect against any attempt by the sender to
deny sending the data. It must also allow for the sender of
the data to verify that receipt was by (and only by) the
authorized recipient.
Access Control . Access control guards against
unauthorized access to a resource such as reading, writing, or
deleting data. It guarantees that all physical components of
the distributed system on the organization's premise are
accessible only to authorized individuals. Examples of
physical components include terminals, terminal controllers,
modems, nodes, data links, and telecommunication lines.
Access control also detects and identifies any attempt to
observe, tamper with, or extract information from the network
by an unauthorized person or device. Once a known violation
has occurred an appropriate action can be taken to prevent
future occurrences.
Denial of Service Protection. Adequate alternate paths
allow transmission of data between points in a distributed
system where the need for transmission of data exists. These
paths also ensure that alternate means of transmitting has
been identified, implemented, and tested. For critical data,
contingencies should address failure by the primary and backup
paths.
This thesis focuses on security threats unique to
distributed systems. The investigation begins by identifying
characteristics and assets of distributed systems. Security
threats unique to distributed systems are then identified,
with an analysis of possible countermeasures for the
identified threats.
II. DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. DEFINITION
There is not a universally accepted definition to the term
distributed systems. Rather, it describes information systems
with widely different architectures and characteristics. The
absence of such a definition suggests that it is as much a
point of view as a system type with distinguishing
characteristics. There are two fundamental attributes that
all distributed processing systems seem to have in common:
(Lorin, 1988)
1. There are multiple instances of stand-alone computer
systems.
2. The stand-alone systems can communicate electronically.
When attempting to evaluate a system, a diagram can show
how pieces of equipment are connected. Diagrams of the system
structure, or topology, can be helpful but do not fully
describe the system. Four other important characteristics
should also be included. (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
1. Where the processing is performed
2. What communication links are used
3
.
Where the information is stored
4 What rules or standards are in place
B. MODES OF DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING
Rapid technological advances continue to impact
interconnect capability, processor capacity, software
methodology, and industry pricing structures. These changes
have expanded the set of designs available in solving
information processing problems (Ahituv and Sadan, 1985) . The
significance of the distributed processing lies in the variety
of systems choices allowing organizations to better fit the
information system architecture to their own organizational
structure (Buchanan and Linowes, 1980) . Figure 1 displays the







Stand-Alone Tightly Loosely Network Distributed
Systeis Coupled Coupled Processing
Figure 1 Distributed System Continuum
The following grouping of systems based on the degrees of
the two fundamental attributes of multiple nodes and
electronic communication are identified for comparison.
Stand-alone Systems. A stand-alone system is one that can
be treated as a distinct entity. There is no form of
electronic communications to any other system.
Tightly Coupled Systems. Tightly coupled systems are
multiprocessor systems. They are a population of processors
sharing addressing to memory and devices. This sharing is
accomplished by utilizing single operating system. The
existence of a single operating system results in the presence
of a space-time coherence between the processors. A unit
where space-time coherence exists can be managed as a single
node. A node is an element of a computer network.
Loosely Coupled Systems. The loose interconnection of
computer systems comes very close to the concept of
distributed processing by the attribute of multiple complete
systems. They are systems connected over I/O pathways,
traditionally distinct from networks. Many of these pathways
differ from tightly coupled systems only in the physical sense
that they do not share memory or operating systems. They may
be functionally quite dependent, and as a result take on the
characteristics of a single node, a single 'system', rather
than an interconnection of two nodes.
Networked Systems. There are many types of networks
displaying a broad range of characteristics. They can vary
from completely autonomous systems with the added ability to
communicate electronically, to diskless workstations
completely dependent on the network server for all secondary
storage and communications operations. Each type of network
has some unique set of properties that makes it attractive
based on service provided, cost, reliability, serviceability,
flexibility, etc. As well, each unique network possesses some
set of properties that make it similar in nature to other
network types.
C. NETWORKED SYSTEM
A second approach at identifying and grouping distributed
systems can be accomplished through the examination of system
structures. By this approach four system structures that
qualify as distributed are identified. (McNurlin and Sprague,
1989)
A hierarchy of processors . This structure is typically
the most common in larger information systems that have
shifted toward increased distribution and end-user computing.
Topographically, the largest computer resides at the top and
personal computers or terminals at the bottom, as displayed in
Figure 2. At least three possible schemes for data storage
can be supported by this particular organization. First, all
data can be stored at the top of the hierarchy. Secondly,
master records can be stored at the top, with subsets at
intermediate levels to support lower level processing.
Thirdly, master records can be stored where they are most used












Personal Computers / Workstations
Figure 2 Hierarchy of processors.
A network of cooperating workstations . This structure is





Figure 3 Cooperating workstations.
There is no particular hierarchy of processors. Any
workstation can call on another workstation in the network for
data or service, provided it is authorized to do so.
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Decentralized stand-alone systems. Decentralization is
the dedication of applications to systems in such a way that




Figure 4 Decentralized stand-alone
systems.
It occurs when applications that have traditionally been
sharing a large machine are moved to several smaller systems.
This is frequently seen in organizational information systems
originally designed in the 1960 's where many small data
centers existed within a large organization. These
independent systems have been subsequently modernized to allow
a little data to flow among the decentralized systems, but
mostly in an upward direction toward corporate management.
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Office systems that communicate with data processing
.
This structure is a hybrid of two other identified structures.
As displayed in Figure 5, it is a combination of the hierarchy
approach (for Data Processing) and the network of cooperating










Personal Computers / Workstations
Figure 5 Office systems that communicate
with data processing
Each of these four network architectures discussed
previously need additional specification to describe fully the
degree to which it is distributed. These additional factors
are:
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Distributed processing . An important distinction must be
made between decentralized and distributed processing.
Distributed processing contains some concept of system, of
node relations, dependency, and interaction. It provides for
the processing of an application on a computer that is located
outside the corporate data center and operates on a network.
In its ideal form it is a mapping of a single application
across several nodes. The goal is to move processing closer
to the user or to use different machines to do the part of a
job each does best. A distributed system is a system in the
sense that there is interaction, cooperation, and some form of
dependency between nodes.
One current form of distributed processing is based on the
concept of cooperative processing. These systems operate by
dividing processing between two or more geographically
dispersed nodes. After completion of processing, one node
sends data to another node for further processing.
All forms of distributed processing are dependent on the
cooperative effort of the system's nodes. More advanced forms
of distributed processing are possible with increased
interoperability. Interoperability is the capacity for nodes
using different operating systems and different hardware
platforms protocols to work together on the same task. Node
interoperability can be supported in two forms:
• Transparent communication between system applications
using system protocols.
13
The interactive or two-way flow of messages between user
applications.
Connectivity among processors . Each processor in a
distributed system can send data and messages to any other
processor through electronic communication linkages. A clear
trait of electronic communication is that as distance grows,
the communication gets slower, less reliable, and more
expensive. Breakpoints based on distance have been accepted
because of orders of magnitude differences in speed and
reliability. These are often grouped as : In-Frame, Bus,
Local-Area, Metropolitan-Area, and Wide-Area, and Global
Interconnection. Emerging communications technology is
beginning to provide interconnect pathways at speeds
sufficient to blur the importance of physical distance. The
reliability of node interconnection is also dependent on the
availability of alternate communication paths.
Distributed databases. As seen in the discussion of
systems displaying a hierarchy of processors, the location of
data storage is an important design consideration. Two
possible avenues are available based on the duplication of
data. The first is dividing a database and distributing its
portions throughout a system without duplicating the data.
Any portion of the data should be accessible from any node,
subject to access authorizations. Data location is
transparent to users, it is the system's responsibility to
know where all data is stored. The second possible avenue is
14
based on distributed duplicate data. In this approach the
same data is stored at several locations, although one site
generally contains the master file. Here, the system is
responsible for synchronizing data which can be a significant
problem.
System-wide rules. The shift away from centralized
systems and toward distributed systems is making connectivity
more important than in the past. This shift permits greater
control of operations by components of an organization, yet
can potentially degrade connectivity. Operating discipline
for the entire distributed system needs to be developed and
enforced at all times. These rules include intercommunication
between nodes, security, data accessibility, program and file
transfer, and common operating procedures.
15
III. DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM ASSETS AND THREATS
There is an interrelationship between assets and potential




Figure 6 Relationship Between Assets,
Threats, and Countermeasures.
Security plans are a tailored application of countermeasures
to protect assets against threats.
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A. ASSETS
An asset is any resource of value to an organization.
Some assets are easily defined or tangible. Other assets are
more difficult to identify. Types of information system
assets are grouped as hardware, software, data, facilities,
personnel, documentation and supplies (Pfleeger, 1989).
Examples of assets within each of the identified categories
are:
• Hardware: Storage devices such as disk and tape drives.
• Software: System utilities.
• Data: Confidential or proprietary information.
• Facilities: Environmental systems such as air
conditioning
.
• Personnel: Systems analysts or consultants.
• Documentation: Of security policy test and evaluation.
• Supplies: Paper and printer ribbons.
For a more complete list of potential system assets, see
Appendix A (COMNAVDAC, 1991) . The degree with which a system
is distributed changes the scope and value of these assets.
B. THREATS
A threat is a circumstance that has the potential to cause
loss or harm. (Pfleeger, 1989) Threats exhibit varying
degrees of detectability and controllability. Fire is an
example of a threat which is easily detectable and
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controllable. Natural disasters such as floods are easily
detected but difficult to control. Wiretapping lines of
communication or infection by computer virus are examples of
threats which are neither easily detected nor controlled.
As in a stand-alone system, threats in a distributed
environment may impact assets in four ways: (COMVAVDAC, 1991)
• Modification: Altering an asset by changing its
representation or adding more to the representation.
• Destruction: The asset is not reparable or recoverable.
• Disclosure: Information is accessed by or released to
someone lacking a need-to-know.
• Denial of services: Resources are unavailable to
authorized users.
Distributed systems have complicated computer security.
As computer systems are moved from their well protected
centralized facilities to unprotected offices, there is an
increase in the vulnerability of these systems. Among the
features of distributed systems that lead to vulnerabilities
are: (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989; Johnson and Layne, 1987)
• The distribution of hardware
• The distribution of software
• The distribution of data
• The distribution of computer expertise
• The distribution of documentation
• The distribution of output
• Different security policies
18
• Different interfaces
• Incompatible security architectures
• Composite risks
• Lack of strong technical history in network security
• External exposure of communications media and facilities
Distributed systems move the actual processing capability
to end users. End users gain physical and logical control of
many assets once under the control of the computer or
information systems department. This shift in control often
entails a shift in responsibility for protection of the
system's assets. (Ahituv and Sadan, 1985) The same assets
present in centralized systems are present in distributed
systems. It is the change in the environment that leads to
changes in threats to the system. (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
Some assets are easily valued by purchase or development
costs. The valuation of other assets, such as information, is
organizationally dependent. (Clark and Wilson, 1987) An
examination of distinct approaches by the Department of
Defense (DOD) and major corporations can highlight this
dependency. (Chalmers, 1986)
The DoD has prioritized potential impacts of threats and
has placed disclosure of information as its top concern.
(Winters, 1990) It also has a long standing and highly
formalized methodology for the classification and protection
of information. Management has determined the value of the
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information. The classification of information processed and
the type of access allowed dictates what pre-defined minimum
security requirements must be met by any system. System
managers must use available technology to meet these difficult
goals (if possible) without regard to cost or impact of the
countermeasures on the organization. (Johnson and Layne, 1987)
The corporate approach has prioritized potential impacts
by threats on its assets and has placed modification
(integrity) of information as its top concern. (Winters, 1990)
Corporations tend to treat information as an asset with an
identifiable financial value. It is a management decision to
value information and to decide what countermeasures are cost
efficient. Management must also consider the countermeasure's
impact on organizational operations. (IBM, 1987)
C. SOURCES OF THREATS
The environment in which information exists influences how
threats may impact assets. A historical review of sources of
exposure to financial loss can be useful in constructing a
security plan. These exposures can vary significantly
depending upon the nature of the establishment and the degree
of management controls in place. One example of such reviews
was conducted by IBM. This study shows that personnel within
the organization may be the greatest source of threats. (IBM,
1987) A similar study recently conducted further demonstrates
that personnel with approved access represented the greatest
20
threat to information systems. (Jackson, 1990) A summary of
the report is shown below:
• Insider threats: 70% to 80% of Annual Dollar Loss
• Physical threats: 20% to 25% of Annual Dollar Loss
• Outsider threats: 1% to 3% of Annual Dollar Loss
The shift toward end-user computing and distributed systems
make security by physical isolation impracticable.
D. ATTACKS ON INFORMATION IN TRANSIT
Attacks against information may occur while in transit or
in storage (see Figure 7) . Controls designed to protect
information in storage are well understood. The same
countermeasures applicable to stand alone systems are also
applicable to distributed systems.
Information in transit is inherently insecure because the
telecommunication process itself is insecure. Both
information in transit and the telecommunication process are
insecure for two reasons. First, the telecommunication
service provider has been isolated from any legal obligation
to protect the confidentiality of the information that moves
through its facilities. Secondly, securing data
communications would require both investment and technical











Figure 7 Information is storage and in
transit.
Information in transit attacks may be grouped into the general
categories of passive and active attacks. (Muftic, 1989;
Stallings, 1990)
Passive attacks are designed to disclose information. It
may involve content learning where information is observed as
it passes through communication channels without altering its
contents. Passive attacks may also involve the analysis of
message traffic patterns on communication channels by
examining the location and identity of users, or message
length and frequency. (Stallings, 1990) Traffic analysis can
provide valuable information even though the contents of the
messages are protected.
Active attacks may involve disclosure, modification, or
destruction of information. Message stream modifications
results from selectively inserting, replaying, or modifying
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messages. It may also involve the deletion, delay, and order
change of messages. Services may by denied by delay or
discard of all the messages.
In general, passive attacks are more difficult to detect
but are easier to prevent. Active attacks are easier to
detect but are more difficult to counter.
The three most significant threats to telecommunication
facilities have remained consistent over the past 75 years.
They are people, adverse weather, and accidental destruction
of telecommunication facilities. (Menkus, 1990)
• People may misuse facilities by committing unauthorized
access or by avoiding the payment of user fees and
charges.
• Telecommunication facilities are vulnerable to natural
disasters such as floods, ice storms, blizzards,
earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes.
• Accidental destruction of telecommunication facility is
usually as a result of a fire that affects either the
installed telecommunication circuits or the structure in
which the switching facility is located.
Telecommunication cables strung outdoors on poles are
commonly placed along a major highway where they may be
struck and damaged.
E. OPPORTUNITY OF THREATS
In comparing threats and assets, the opportunity for a
successful attack may be dependent on time. One approach to
examining the effect of time is by dividing computer operation
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into stages. Five stages are presented to indicate possible
points of vulnerability. They are: (Bequai, 1983)
1. Input - when information is translated into a language
that the computer understands.
2. Output- Often taking the form of thefts of data, customer
lists, personnel lists, trade secrets, marketing plans,




Programming - the introduction of the step-by-step
instructions for solving the many problems it will later
encounter.
4. Usage- Abuse and theft involving the unauthorized use of
an employer's computer.
5. Transmission - Transmission of data back and forth
between computers or computers and remote terminals.
24
IV. ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES
A countermeasure is any action, procedure, technique,
device or other measure that reduces the vulnerability of a
computer system to the realization of a threat. A
vulnerability is a weakness in the protective measures that
can be exploited to cause harm or loss. (COMNAVDAC, 1991) An
example of a vulnerability is inadequate fire protection. For
the purposes of this thesis, the terms countermeasure and
control are used interchangeably.
Countermeasures may be conceptualized as performing three
basic functions. These functions are prevention, detection
and correction of threats. (Bynon, 1990) A particular
countermeasure may exhibit more than one of the three basic
functions. It may also protect more than one type of asset
against more than one type of threat. (Ahituv and Sadan, 1985)
Most countermeasures used in stand-alone systems apply to
systems exhibiting a higher degree of distribution. Sometimes
they can be applied directly to distributed systems no matter
what the degree of distribution. In other cases the
application is very different. For purposes of discussion,





• Physical access controls
• Logical access controls
• Virus controls
• Application development controls
• Communication controls
• Electronic emanation controls
• Contingency planning and backup controls
These controls can be used to meet the security goals
unigue to distributed systems identified in Chapter I.
Methodologies for applying these countermeasures will be
reviewed in Chapter V. While the groups of controls could be
applied to any information system, distributed or not, the
emphasis will be on the application of these controls to the
specialized reguirements of a distributed environment. (IBM,
1987)
Each system node must assess its own particular needs and
practical countermeasures. In large distributed systems, an
organization may not be able to dictate policy to other nodes
on a network or to common communication carriers. In such
cases additional countermeasures must be considered to provide
continued system operation. (IBM, 1987)
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROLS
Organizational controls are policies and guidelines
established by the highest levels of management. They are
strategic in nature in that they dictate policy organization-
wide and impact how an information system will be used. It is
how management demonstrates its commitment (fulfills its
responsibility) to the protection of the organization's
information system assets. Examples are the establishment of
personnel controls or an asset ownership/responsibility
policy.
Management Commitment /Responsibility . The formulation of
security policies and procedures shows the commitment of
higher level management to security. It also establishes that
individuals will be held accountable for security. The
designation of a security officer provides a central authority
for issues dealing with security. Some functions of this
position would be to answer security guestions, interpret
policy, and make security effective for the distributed
system. (Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986)
With increasing degrees of system distribution, the
distinction between the traditional data processing person and
the traditional user is being lost. Yet, management has a
responsibility to its employees and to the organization. It
must remove or at least minimize the potential for employees
to compromise the system. This includes the responsibility to
reduce temptation as well. To fulfill its responsibility
27
management must establish personnel guidelines, which is
addressed under personnel controls.
Considerations when establishing organization-wide
controls . Organizational controls might apply across several
divisions within an organization or across several
organizations. When establishing organizational-wide
controls, management:
• Must consider organizational culture and different needs.
• Must acknowledge the desire for each organizational entity
to set their own standards.
• Identify who is the network (system) administrator.
• Address who defines minimum security reguirements.
• Establish a Memorandum Of Agreement (MOA) for multiple
organizations connected to the same distributed system.
• Address the problem of connected networks and where
differences in protocols, security controls are handled.
Asset Ownership/Responsibility . As assets are moved from
centralized systems to distributed systems the responsibility
for these assets must move also. Responsibility is assigned
for both physical assets and data ownership.
Initiation and implementation of a data ownership program
where none exists is not an easy task. Specifically
designating responsibility for information is a task much
broader than the computer processing area. It may have
implications that involve management philosophy, such as how
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the organization functions, and could influence the reporting
structure in the enterprise. (IBM, 1986)
Policy Establishment . Policies should establish periodic
audits, password usage, and adequate backup/recovery of
distributed system resources. New system standards should
include good security program documentation and operational
procedures. They should also address source and compiled code
library management, complete system specifications, and
procedures to check input data for completeness, relevance,
and accuracy. (Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986)
Operational Procedures. Operational procedures are an
example of organizational controls. They establish procedures
for day to day operations on all nodes of the system.
Traditional operational controls include such things as
controlling errors, supervising error recovery, controlling
forms and input/output media.
Beyond selecting reliable system components, management
should also implement good problem management techniques and
procedures. Procedures for end users to log, monitor and
correct errors over a broad geographic area or across
organizations must be carefully designed. Unintentional
errors by authorized users is already a major problem. The
increase in end-user manipulation has the potential to
increase these errors. End-users may not be able to recognize
or correctly identify problems.
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Magnetic media. Magnetic storage media is itself an
asset. More importantly, the media is used to hold
information assets. Centralized computer facilities develop
and enforce rigorous media control policies. These policies
address areas such as media marking, storage, destruction,
security, and accountability reguirements. A list outlining
possible policy components is included in Appendix B.
Distributed systems distribute information. The lack of
concentrated information storage, particularly for systems
comprised of workstations or personal computers, often results
in omitting control of magnetic media. Organizational policy
must address the value of the media and information assets to
select appropriate media controls.
B. PERSONNEL CONTROLS
Personnel controls are classified as a type of
organizational controls. Personnel internal to the
organization have been identified as the greatest risk group
to an information system. It is as an area where management
can set policy to enhance the security of the system. These
policies may include, for example, segregating duties or
establishing criteria for employee selection and retention.
The need. End-user computing is supported with increased
distribution. Increased user processing capability also
increases their ability to incorrectly process information
with no particular checks and balances. It can potentially
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corrupt databases unless the system is robust enough to
withstand the challenges to system integrity. It also
increases problems since access by other than select
information system (IS) staff involves more than highly
controlled operations or reguests.
Countermeasures . Personnel should be aware of the value
of system assets. The value of information assets is rarely
appreciated until it is corrupted or otherwise no longer
accessible. To help protect these assets, the following
general areas may be considered: (Jackson, 1990)
• Background checks.
• New Employee Indoctrination.
• Statement of Security Responsibility.
• Drug Testing.
• Polygraph Testing.
Some organizations with many distributed processing (DP)
assets and networking facilities conduct a pre-employment
background check. If an individual is processing critical or
sensitive data, a program of periodic background checks is
advisable. New employees should be indoctrinated into their
responsibilities. Compliance with DP asset protection
responsibilities must be mandatory, and should be considered
a condition of continued employment. Responsibility must be
assigned to the data user, owner, custodian, and management.
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The establishment of an employee code of conduct can clearly
delineate expected employee responsibility. (IBM, 1986)
The concentration of data within an organization, such as
accounting data, is a potential danger because it may allow
realization of malicious purposes. Separation of data may not
be practical. Satisfactory control can be gained by
separating personnel who have access to the data during
capture, processing, storing, and retrieval activities. This
separation is labeled segregation of duties.
Segregation of duties is a basic principle of internal
control. The basic premise of segregation is that once data,
processes, or duties are segregated, malicious intent can be
realized only through collective efforts. Naturally, such a
coordination of employees to exploit the system is difficult
to coordinate. Additional segregation of duties can be
applied to information systems development and operation
activities. (Ahituv and Sadan, 1986)
Because of the nature of network environments, management
may want to place more emphasis on and exercise additional
controls over job rotation and employee account restriction.
Dual responsibility (two person integrity) provides further
measures of security. (Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986)
Legal issues. Management must consider the legal issues
of personnel policy. For example, monitoring and privacy of
electronic mail have been a subject of debate within the legal
system. (Beguai, 1983) With end-user computing, employees may
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develop their own applications. The organization must now
consider who owns any patents, copyrights, licenses, and trade
secrets. A contract between end-users and the organization
can address these issues so that both understand their rights
and responsibilities. (Pfleeger, 1989) These policies may be
applied over all nodes of a system. The nodes may be
distributed over a broad geographic area, each with its own
culture or legal system.
C. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
Environmental threats as a group are the most visible and
tangible threats. They can also be the most devastating.
Accordingly, management is most often willing to commit
resources to control these threats. As the distributed system
extends across organizational, sites the chance for fire,
water, and natural disaster damage increase. Environmental
protection must satisfy two objectives: preservation of
physical assets and system availability. Most of the security
measures used for the computer center need to be carried over
into distributed systems. (Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986) The
following environmental controls are primarily oriented to the
protection of building and facilities. (IBM, 1987)
Air conditioning. Air conditioning is employed to
maintain temperature and humidity within system operating
parameters. Large computing centers reguire special air
conditioning eguipment to meet stringent reguirements.
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Distributed system nodes such as work stations or intelligent
terminals are designed to operate in office environments. If
continued system operation is needed in the event of facility
air condition system failure, consideration should be made for
the installation of a backup system.
Electrical power controls . Electrical power controls
protect systems against power supply outages and fluctuations.
Some common mechanisms are line conditioners, uninterruptible
power supply (UPS) systems, and backup electric generators.
(King, 1990) Both line conditioners and UPS systems filter
commercial power by absorbing fluctuations and ensuring clean
electrical power. UPS will also continue to supply
electricity for a short time to safely operate equipment.
During this period other backup power sources are invoked or
equipment is shut off. Backup electric generators can be used
not only to provide power to data processing equipment, but to
other essential services such as lighting, chilled water, and
air-conditioning systems. The high cost of installation and
maintenance of these countermeasures, particularly for backup
electric generators, must be justified by the degree of
dependency of the data processing operations. (Jackson, 1990)
Water. Computer systems are both dependent on and
adversely effected by water. Water is used for cooling either
through air conditioning or system components themselves. An
interruption in supply normally leads to the system exceeding
safe operating conditions. Undesired events such as leaks in
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plumbing, air-conditioning, chilled water, or fire suppression
systems must be anticipated. Thought should also be given to
roof integrity, integrity, and under floor drainage
capabilities. Prefitted waterproof covers or simple plastic
sheeting located in equipment rooms is a valuable
countermeasure should water leakage occur. (Jackson, 1990)
Lighting. The degree of lighting requirements within a
particular facility is dependent on the need for continued
operation in the event of power failure. If continued
operation is needed, then the power requirements for adequate
lighting must be considered when selecting backup power system
capacity.
Fire controls . Centralized computing facilities use a
variety of fire detection and suppression techniques.
Distributed system components, often located in office
buildings, are partially protected by fire detection and
automatic fire suppression systems normally required for such
facilities. (King, 1990) The value of the equipment in any
particular location will dictate whether it is economically
feasible to install dedicated automatic systems that use C02
or Halon. Portable fire extinguishers are an excellent first
line of defense in keeping small fires from spreading.
Clearly labeled and visible extinguishers should be placed in
centralized computer rooms, tape and disks storage areas, form
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storage, and any other auxiliary machine rooms within the
facility. (Jackson, 1990)
Housekeeping . In a traditional centralized facility
housekeeping measures emphasizes cleanliness and minimal
flammable material (paper) storage within or near the computer
room to reduce the risk of fire. Distributed system nodes
within office spaces makes this approach difficult to
implement. Where waste paper accumulates the use of self
extinguishing waste paper containers can be effective in
reducing the fire threat. (Jackson, 1990)
D. PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROLS
Physical access controls involve limiting access to system
assets such as hardware, storage media, and documentation.
End-user computing supported by distributed systems
necessitates increased access to system assets while the
assets themselves are spread over a broad geographic area.
These controls strive to allow authorized personnel access
without excessive effort.
The implementation of physical access controls must
include the identification of areas where they may be
practiced. Some possible areas unique to distributed systems
are: (IBM, 1987)
• Remote facilities whether located in the same building or
in another site.
• Communication link components.
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• Common-carrier-provided equipment, links, and facilities
through which organizational data must be transmitted.
• Network control center facilities that normally house all
of the specialized network equipment for patching,
monitoring, and testing network components.
• Information center facilities that have been established
as the focal points for helping end-users in the design
and implementation of specialized department applications.
• User required materials like operations manuals, floppy
disks, and copies of licensed vendor supplied software.
• Shared remote printer output areas.
The centralized system approach to physical access
controls emphasizes the placement of computer resources in
limited access areas. This approach segregates assets such as
computers, peripherals, removable secondary storage media and
personnel. Distributed systems move assets into environments
such as offices where limiting access to all components is
neither practical or desirable. In these cases additional
measures such as securing cables and locks on pilferable items
provides added security. (Jackson, 1990)
Unauthorized physical access requires knowledge of the
asset's existence. The visibility of critical system
components must be limited. Avoid advertising the location of
assets such as wiring closets or network file servers with
external markings or signs. (Jackson, 1990)
The required complexity of physical access controls can
depend on the size of the organization and hours of operation
at any particular node of the system. For small organizations
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simple measures may be appropriate since an unauthorized
individual would be easily recognized. In larger
organizations this approach is not practical and would require
more formalized controls. Some methods that restrict access
include: (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
• Having a receptionist monitor access at the office
entrance.
• Using badges and color codes on badges to indicate
authorization.
• Signing passes for taking assets in and out of the
facility.
After working hours, physical access can be further
restricted since authorized user activity is low. Some
heightened measures include locking doors and windows, having
adequate night lights, and hiring a security service. While
not authorized users, janitorial services are active after
hours and require access to perform their functions. Of
particular concern are the procedures used by the janitorial
service. Though convenient to the janitors, unlocking several
doors provides the opportunity for unauthorized personnel to
gain access. The effective control of keys is an important
part of physical access controls. (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
E. LOGICAL ACCESS CONTROLS
Access controls provide for the prevention of unauthorized
use of assets. Unauthorized use includes the use of an asset
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in an unauthorized manner. (COMNAVDAC, 1991) Access
privileges are a function of three basic components. These
components are defined as: (NCSC, 1987)
• Subjects. An active entity, generally a person, process,
or device that causes information to flow among objects or
changes the system state.
• Objects. A passive entity that contains or receives
information. Access to an object potentially implies
access to the information it contains. Examples of
objects are: records, blocks, pages, segments, files,
directories, directory trees, and programs, as well as
bits, bytes, words, fields, processors, video displays,
keyboards, clocks, printers, etc., (network resources)
access rights (entry privileges)
.
• Conditions for resource usage.
By manipulating these three basic components, access
control limits the rights or capabilities of a subject to
communicate with other subjects. They can also limit access
to functions or services within a computer system or network.
(NCSC, 1987)
Mechanisms providing logical access control may be
structured in the form of lists, a matrix, a binary tree, or
a more general hierarchical structure. In any form, access
control mechanisms must contain information necessary to
provide controlled access to network assets. (Muftic, 1989)
Logical Segmentation. Logical access performs two types
of segmentation. The first is the identification and
verification of authorized users. The second is to limit
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authorized users access to only those resources required to
accomplish assigned job functions. (IBM, 1987)
Placing a value on information often facilitates grouping
the information into classes. Multiple classes of information
can be processed within or across several nodes of a system.
The method of limiting access to resources by segregation must
be part of the security plan. Five possible modes of system
operation based on the classification (s) of information and
access allowed are: partitioned, dedicated, multilevel, system
high, and limited access. These modes of operation dictate
the type of segregation employed and are defined as: (NCSC,
1987)
• Partitioned. A mode of operation wherein all personnel
have the clearance, but not necessarily a formal access
approval and need-to-know, for all information handled by
the system.
• Dedicated. The mode of operation in which the system is
specifically and exclusively dedicated to and controlled
for the processing of one particular type of
classification of information, either for full-time
operation or for a specific period of time.
• Multilevel. The mode of operation that allows two or more
classification levels of information to be processed
simultaneously within the same system when some users are
not cleared for all levels of information present.
• System High. The mode of operation in which system
hardware and software is only trusted to provide
discretionary protection between users. In this mode, the
entire system, to include all components electrically
and/or physically connected, must operate with security
measures commensurate with the highest classification and
sensitivity of the information being processed and / or
stored. All system users in this environment must possess
clearances and authorization for all information contained
in the system. All system output must be clearly marked
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with the highest classification until the information has
been reviewed manually by an authorized individual to
ensure appropriate classification and that caveats have
been affixed.
Limited Access. A mode of operation relating to
unclassified data only, clearances are not required, but
access is restricted to users with need-to-know. The
control is provided by special access controls such as
read/write keys, user Ids and passwords.
These modes of operation are applicable to all systems no
matter what the degree of system distribution. It is the
mechanism to implement the mode of operation that becomes more
complex as the degree of distribution increases.
Distributed system design should include sufficient
controls to defend themselves against access threats.
Unfortunately, most systems are not considered sufficiently
trustworthy to do so. Information systems not trusted to
segregate information of various classification levels operate
in the dedicated or system high mode. In such operation, all
authorized users must have security clearances appropriate for
the highest classification of data on the system though
actual access may not include all system objects. Output from
these systems is protected as though it contains the most
highly classified information. Output must be reliably
reviewed and its actual classification and sensitivity
verified. (Neugent, 1989)
Centralized/Distributed Control. Two basic designs exist
for network logical access controls. Centralized access
control involves a centrally managed and controlled network
41
monitoring and security system. A particular location or node
provides system wide:
• Access authorization management.
• Issuance of user identification.
• Password management.
• Audit trail management.
Under distributed access control, each node independently
handles such requirements though a frequent information
exchange process. Users having gained access on one node
normally are accepted on other nodes of the system. Larger
systems tend to employ architectures that are a combination of
the two. (Lace, 1990; Browne, 1984)
Effect of topology . The network topology determines how
interconnect schemes will influence the ability to secure
data. (Lace, 1990) An important factor in deciding on how to
implement logical access control in a distributed environment
is the topology of the system. The hierarchical or star
topology favors central control. A star topology or
hierarchical interconnect topology offers the best security
control because the control can be centralized or constructed
modular ly.
Other topologies favors distributed control and are
characterized by a lack of an identifiable centralized node to
provide access controls to the network. Architectures such as
ring, mesh, or bus topologies, tend to disperse the control to
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individual nodes. These topologies rely on exchanges cf
information to maintain system integrity and security. (Lace,
1990)
Centralized control suffers in performance since all
requests must first be passed to, processed by, and returned
from the central node. Administrative overhead grows as the
degree of access control increases, and as the system size
increases. Distributed network control is weak in security
policy enforcement. This deficiency stems from different
security attributes available on each node. For example, data
that is weakly protected on one node could be sent to another
node, altered, and returned to the original without the
originator knowing that this occurred. Thus, data integrity
can be easily compromised unless detection and subsequent
countermeasures are implemented. These measures could include
host or user alternatives, such as port protection devices,
and encryption/decryption devices. (Lace, 1990)
Implementation . Implementation of logical access controls
requires invoking good administrative procedures. These
procedures must first identify the resources to be protected.
They must identify each individual in the organization with a
unique user identifier. Lastly, they must provide an
authentication capability to verify that a user is really who
he or she claims to be. These procedures may be accomplished
by having each user represented to the system by:
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• What the user knows - passwords.
• What the user has - magnetic card or token.
• What the user is - biometrics such as fingerprints,
signatures, retinal scans.
They may also be accomplished by providing an
authorization scheme by which the resource owner has the
responsibility:
• To identify the users or user groups who may access the
protected resources.
• To identify the access authorization to be granted and
assigning to each individual user or user group.
• Of recording resource utilization.
• Of taking appropriate management action to correct
variances to normal behavior and to prevent future
occurrences of violations.
F. VIRUS CONTROLS
Virus is defined as "Code that covertly replicates itself
onto previously uncontaminated media without initiation by
the operator of authorized users." (SECNAVINST, 1989)
Replication usually occurs during copying of files to magnetic
media, or during computer to computer communications. The
code usually contains malicious logic that is triggered by
some predetermined event. When triggered, the code then takes
a hostile action against host computer systems.
The issues surrounding malicious software such as computer
virus are intriguing. It is important not to overlook the
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fact that they are created by people. Hence, computer virus
can be addressed a personnel problem. A virus is a tool used
by people to extend and enhance their ability to create
mischief and damage. Malicious software exploits the same
vulnerabilities as can knowledgeable users. Thus, any steps
taken to reduce the likelihood of attack by malicious software
should address the likelihood of unauthorized use by computer
users. (NIST, 1987)
Controls based on system size. A distinction may be made
between multiuser computers with associated networks and
personal computers (workstations) with associated networks.
(NIST, 1987) Virus prevention differs mainly in the
following two respects:
• The relative lack of technical controls.
• The resultant emphasis this places on less technically
oriented means of protection which necessitates more
reliance on user involvement.
Distributed systems based on personal computers or
workstations typically do not provide technical control for
such things as user authentication, access control, or memory
protection that differentiates between system memory and
memory used by user applications. The lack of controls
permits users to share and modify software. Thus, small
computer based systems are more prone to attack by viruses,
unauthorized users, and related threats. (NIST, 1987)
45
Regardless of the size of the system, the following groups




• Monitoring and audit trails.
• Contingency planning.
Controls based on the degree of distribution. Virus
prevention in the multiuser computer environment is aided by
the centralized system and user management, and the relative
richness of technical controls. Unlike personal computers,
many multiuser systems possess basic controls for user
authentication, for levels of access to files and directories,
and for protected regions of memory. These controls are not
adequate by themselves. Distributed systems can greatly
reduce their vulnerabilities to attack when combined with
other policies and procedures that specifically target viruses
and related threats. (NIST, 1987)
Types of controls. There are a number of different
controls which can be implemented to prevent viruses or detect
those that exist: (Phillips, 1990)
• Use a "virus antibiotic program" on all new software.
• Isolate new software until it is tested.
• Know the origin of all software, don't use unsealed
software from unknown sources.
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• Be wary of download software, especially from public
bulletin boards.
• Don't let anyone put anything on a machine without
authorization.
• Periodically check for reinfection.
• Use file/program checksum.
• Compare the length of programs regularly.
• When ever possible, boot from the hard disk, not a
diskette.
• For diskette-only computers, always boot from the same
write-protected diskette made from an original system
diskette.
• Find and remove extraneous command.com copies from the
hard disk.
• Use type domain mechanisms.
• Ensure proper password use.
• Use trusted system operating systems.
• Ensure purchased commercial software is in its original
shrink-wrapping
.
• Buy software only from reputable sources.
• Restrict access to systems programs and data on a need-to-
know basis.
• Put software on CD-ROM.
• Backup your data files regularly.
• Write protect executable files.
• Encrypt executable files.
• Monitor the modification dates of programs and files.
• Use removable hard disks.
• On a hard disk system, never boot from an "imported"
floppy.
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• Do not keep diskettes inserted unless actively in use.
• Inoculate program files with commercially available virus
protection software.
• Look for changes in volume labels.
• Run suspect programs on unimportant diskettes.
• Watch for changes in a systems 's operation.
• Clear memory before and after running a confidential
program.
• Forbid employees to install unauthorized software on
office computers or to take office software home for use.
• Never attempt to isolate or remove a virus from a
currently active computer. Boot from a "clean" diskette.
• Remove from service all copies of a suspect program and
immediately back up all related data.
G. APPLICATION DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS
Application development controls are a set of procedures
to guide the development and maintenance of software used to
store, manipulate, or communicate the organization's
information assets. End-user involvement in application
development has placed new demands on the process. Some of
these demands are:
• Greater demands of features, performance, flexibility.
• Demand greater involvement in the development process.
• Their acceptance of new systems more important.
• May need to operate on different systems (hardware or
operating systems) attached to the network.
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Though satisfying immediate end-user demands, the
localized development of applications can lead to incompatible
data. The close coupling of data to specific applications
result in isolated islands of data.
Countermeasures . Traditional application development
controls consist of steps such as project phase reviews under
a project control system, establishing standards, controlling
changes, quality control, and library content control.
Improved programming technology techniques like structured
programming enhance software portability and maintainability.
The auditing of applications to a set of expectations is also
beneficial in maintaining compatibility across a distributed
system.
Organizations that choose to implement a distributed
approach to applications development should also be prepared
to support the new environment. Some items which should be
considered for inclusion in guidelines are:
• Acquiring only authorized software that meets
organizational needs.
• Documentation requirements for locally-developed code.
• Rigorous change procedures.
• Downloading of object code only from the host.
• Testing and integration procedures for new applications.
• Data backup and migration practices.
• Documentation requirements for operation of the
application.
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• Requirements for logging application events.
• Requirements for data integrity.
• Requirements for auditing application results.
• Requirements for logging of input/output errors.
• Requirements for fault isolation and resolution.
H. COMMUNICATION CONTROLS
Distributed systems is defined in Chapter I by the
presence of electronic communications between multiple nodes
of a system. Telecommunications is identified in Chapter III
as inherently insecure. (Menkus, 1990) The implementation of
controls designed to protect communications is essential to
maintain the integrity of a distributed system. Two groups of
controls will be examined. They are cryptographic and dial-up
controls.
The telecommunication process involves an origin, a
destination, and the intervening transmission. Transmission
is the aspect of telecommunications where the inherent
weakness in most data communications security processes is to
be found. Transmission is the most complex and unpredictable
aspect of telecommunications. It is the unpredictability that
created the weakness. (Menkus, 1990)
Communications Security Approaches. All communications
controls are classified as providing link oriented or end-to-
end oriented services. Link oriented controls protect
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information in transit on each discrete communication link
between nodes. End-to-end controls protect information in
transit from its source to its destination. These two
approaches are implemented differently and provide different
security services. (Rutledge and Hoffman, 1986)
Cryptography . Cryptography involves rendering plain text
unintelligible and for converting encrypted text into
intelligible text. The implementation of cryptographic
controls may be implemented in several ways. Some examples
are:
• Link encryption. One physical communication link is
protected by installing cryptographic devices on each end
of the communications link.
• Integrated cryptography. The node's operating system
controls the capacity to selectively encrypt information
before transmission.
• Application Software. Application software controls the
capacity to encrypt information.
Cryptographic controls have two major limitations. First,
encrypted information protection is limited to content
disclosure. It is best used as a supplemental control to
defeat disclosure of information threats for information both
in transmission and in storage. Secondly, effectiveness of
cryptography is based on the quality of the selected
encryption algorithm, cipher key generation, and cipher key
protection. (IBM, 1986)
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Cryptography may be used as both a link oriented control
and an end-to-end oriented control in communications security.
Link encryption requires each vulnerable communications link
to be equipped on both ends with an encryption device. Both
the information and system routing instructions are protected
from contents disclosure during transmission. However, the
information is vulnerable to disclosure within any
intermediate node of the distributed system. (Stallings, 1990)
End-to-end encryption involves the source encrypting the
information that is transmitted across the distributed system.
Since intermediate nodes may be involved, system routing
information cannot be encrypted. The destination decrypts the
information data by using a shared key. This approach
protects the information from content disclosure both during
transmission and while in any intermediate node but still
suffers limitations. While information is safe from
disclosure, the traffic pattern is not.
Limitations of link oriented or end-to-end oriented
cryptography may prevent either of the schemes from providing
adequate protection. Security requirements may be better met
by the combined use of these two schemes. By employing both
forms of encryption, the origin encrypts the information to be
transmitted using end-to-end encryption. During transmission
link encryption is employed for each vulnerable communication
link. Thus, during transmission the entire message is
protected from disclosure. At any intermediate node, only the
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system routing information is available, the remainder being
protected by the end-to-end encryption.
Dial Up Controls. The ability to remotely access
information systems increases system connectivity for the
organization. Dial up ports can be accessed from anywhere in
the world that is supported by common telephone networks. A
system's dial up ports, regardless of the degree of
distribution, present a major access point to the system where
threats may attack. In addition to the physical access
mechanism, controls such as logical access must be employed to
maintain system integrity. (Troy, 1985)
Dial-up controls are based on three primary functions.
They are identification, audit trail, and brute force attack
limits. User identification and authentication are the
cornerstone of access controls. Audit trails are useful in
identifying user difficulties and attempted intrusions. Brute
force attack limits act by controlling the number of access
attempts per connection session. These functions may be
provided by node or network operating systems. External
devices may also be employed if the systems are not capable of
providing these functions. (Troy, 1985)
The actual implementation of dial up controls can be at
one or both ends of a potential communication link involving
dial up ports. One-ended protection approaches for dial up
communications security employ controls at the host computer's
port. Port protection devices (PPD) are external to the
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system and perform services before and independent of the
system's own access control functions. Primary features of a
PPD include: (Troy, 1985)
• Password tables. Provides password based access
protection for the computer's ports independent of any
potential system password access control.
• Dial-back to call originator. Provides a second level of
user or port authentication beyond the standard PPD
password table. A typical connection attempt might
involve a user accessing the PPD and entering a password.
The PPD ends the connection and validates the user. The
PPD then returns a call to a predetermined number
associated with the given password to establish a
communications session.
• Hiding the port's existence. Several approaches may be
used to mask the port against accidental discovery of the
port's existence. They include user terminal screen
displays that are initially blank or ambiguous, require
user knowledge of procedures to gain access to the system,
or even response by synthesized voice.
• Audit trail of connection events. Provides the system
administrator to review both user difficulties and
unsuccessful attempts to access the port.
Two-ended protection approaches for additional dial-up
communication security may be employed when more positive
identification of the specific terminal or user may be needed.
The two-ended approach uses a device or software on each end
of the communications link. These devices use complex
algorithms uniquely associated with specific terminals or
users. For user convenience algorithms may be embedded into
integrated circuit chips encased in some form of "token" such
as a plastic card. Others are embedded in the circuitry of
system components providing communications services. This
54
approach avoids the user having to remember passwords. The
added protection provided by two-ended protection devices to
the dial-up communications network, however, must be justified
against increased cost. (Troy, 1985)
Backup telecommunication services . To ensure availability
of critical communications services organizations typically
employ two different approaches. The first is to acquire
duplicate communications facilities. The second is to use
alternate communications technologies that can be deployed in
an emergency. Either of these approaches may be implemented
by direct acquisition or as services provided by organizations
that specialize in providing backup communications mechanisms.
(McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
I. ELECTRONIC EMANATION CONTROLS
Electronic emanations are signals transmitted as radiation
through the air and conductors. Emanations security controls
are measures designed to deny unauthorized access to
information that might be derived from intercept and analysis
of compromising emanations. This threat leads the United
States Government to develop the TEMPEST (Transient
ElectroMagnetic Pulse Emanation STandard) program and related
technology. (COMNAVDAC, 1991) Due to cost and rigorous
program requirements, TEMPEST technology is used primarily to
protect classified information. Federal government, military,
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and defense contractors are the primarily users. (Jackson,
1990)
Two traditional approaches are taken to prevent disclosure
through emanations. The first employs shielding system
components or entire computing facilities to trap signals.
The second is the modification of emitted signals such as the
addition of spurious signals. Through shielding or
modification of the emanations, adversaries are prevented from
intercepting and interpreting electromagnetic emanations from
computers, communications devices, and other electronic
equipment. (Jackson, 1990)
Electronic communications used by distributed systems
complicates emanations security. Wire communications media
are subject to passive wiretapping. Microwave signals are
transmitted through the air, and are susceptible to monitoring
anywhere along the signal path. Satellite communications pose
even greater potential for interception. In each case the
volume of information transmitted makes separation of
individual transmissions difficult. Link or end-to-end
oriented communications controls provide additional assurances
of maintaining system integrity.
J. CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND BACKUP CONTROLS
Contingency planning and backup controls are frequently
included as part of organizational controls. A list outlining
components of contingency plans is included in Appendix C.
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These plans must address actions to be taken if processing
centers or support facilities were to face a catastrophic
event. Management must recognize that centralizing processing
into one or a few centers may be a high security risk. If a
successful threat attack wipes out a centralized facility, the
organization could suffer losses even when provisions have
been made for a backup center. (McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
Distributed systems increase the total risk an
organization faces. Yet, its geographically dispersed nodes
and electronic connection also provides a unigue
countermeasure to avoid catastrophes. Multiple nodes present
in distributed systems can provide higher overall reliability
and availability than centralized mainframes.
Organizations which use distributed systems as part of
their disaster recovery program perform critical processing
functions locally rather than centrally. The distribution of
processing permits operations to continue uninterrupted at all
other nodes of the system when one is successfully attacked.
Hardware and application selection to these organizations
becomes critical. Often they are standardized so that each
node is capable of serving as a substitute for any other node.
The arrival of industry open system architectures and families
of compatible systems has helped to lessen this reguirement.
The cost of security by redundancy must be viewed against the
criticality of any particular process or information.
(McNurlin and Sprague, 1989)
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V. SECURING DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS
Commitment by organizational management is critical for
the success of a computer security program (Powell, 1990)
.
Management must be made aware of the impact of threats against
the organization's assets such as compromise of national
security, media attention, monetary loss, or legal liability
(Wood, 1990) . There are two elements in managing computer
security. They are:
• Risk Management.
• Developing a security plan.
Figure 8 displays a general model of protecting assets
from threats. The importance of any particular layer of
controls (identified in Chapter IV) is dependent on the
particular environment in which a distributed system exists.
In this model, system assets are protected by the cumulative
efforts of all controls implemented.
Another model, depicted in Figure 9, is based on the
functionality of controls displaying the relationship between
threats, vulnerabilities, and assets.
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Figure 9 Functionality of controls.
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A. RISK MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY PLAN
Risk management may be either qualitative or quantitative.'
(Palmer, 1990) There are four strategies when addressing risk
control. They are (Pfleeger, 1989)
:
• Risk avoidance. Avoid or prevent loss.
• Risk reduction. Minimize the potential for successful
attack.
• Risk transfer. Move critical functions to systems already
protected.
• Live with it. Risk acceptance with a contingency plan in
event of successful attack.
Applied to distributed systems, risk management is the
process of identifying, measuring, and minimizing uncertain
events affecting system assets. Risks can differ greatly from
one organization to another depending on its activities. (IBM,
1987) Even within an organization, different nodes of a
distributed system may exist in unique environments and
require individual attention. Risk management includes the
following functions: (COMNAVDAC, 1991)
• Risk analysis.
• Cost benefit analysis.
• Safeguard selection.




The purpose of risk analysis is to establish and maintain
the most cost effective controls which provide an acceptable
level of security. It is an orderly process rooted in
management practices. Reasons to perform risk analysis
identified by (Pfleeger, 1989) are:
• Improved security awareness.
• Identify existing assets, vulnerabilities, and controls.
• Improved basis for decisions.
• Justify expenditures for security.
Several different schemes exist for performing risk
analysis. Each scheme follows the same basic steps. These
steps identified by (Pfleeger, 1989) are:
• Identify assets.
• Determine vulnerabilities.
• Estimate likelihood of exploitation.
• Compute expected annual loss.
• Survey application controls and their costs.
• Project annual savings of control.
The selection of possible controls should involve more
than just a cost benefit analysis. The feasibility of each
control may be determined by examining three factors. These
three factors are economic feasibility, technical feasibility,
and operational feasibility. (Browne, 1979)
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• Economic feasibility. Traditional cost benefit analysis of
the value gained by the organization from the control
against the cost of implementing the control.
• Technical feasibility. An organization must possess the
technical capability to manage the control. Industry must
possess the technical capability to provide and maintain
the control.
• Operational feasibility. How the control will influence
the operation of the organization.
Different nodes of a distributed system may select
different controls for the same threats against identical
assets based on these three factors.
Risk analysis is the study of the risk of some action. It
is the first step in identifying threats, assets, and controls
for any system. The risk analysis results are then used as
the basis for developing a comprehensive security program.
A security plan is a comprehensive guide of an
organization's security activities. The plan is both a
description of the organization's current security posture and
blueprint for change. (Bynon, 1990) It is an organization-
wide policy statement by the highest levels of management.
This policy sets the overall goals and provides a set of
benchmarks for measuring achievement. Supporting documents
and instructions provide more detailed and environment
specific objectives. Yet, many security "plans" are a
collection of controls added on a piecemeal basis without
consideration for the overall threat. (Browne, 1979; IBM,
1987)
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The contents of a security plan is specific for a
particular organization as it expresses its goals. A security
plan must also be justifiable in terms of cost and potential
impact on the organization. (Tate, 1988) A simple return on
investment approach may not fully identify benefits derived
from a security program. Consideration must be given to less
tangible services such as the integrity of information used by
management to make decisions. A comprehensive plan can also
be used to an organization's competitive advantage such as
increasing customer confidence. (Wood, 1991) The plan is
subject to periodic review and revision as the security needs
of the organization change. (Jackson, 1990) General areas
that every security plan must address are: (Pfleeger, 1989;
Bynon, 1990; Stephenson, 1991)
• Policy. A statement indicating the goals of a computer
security effort and the willingness of personnel to work
to achieve those goals.
• Current state. A description of the status of security at
the time of the plan.
• Recommendations. Steps that will lead to meeting the
security goals identified previously.
• Accountability. A listing describing who is responsible
for each security activity.
• Timetable. A record identifying when different security
functions are to be done.
• Continuing attention. A statement specifying a structure
for periodic review and revision of the security plan.
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When establishing a security plan, select those items
identified under risk management which provide the greatest
visible benefit for the least cost. Initial success of the
plan will bolster management support. As the organization
matures in its security posture, less overt emphasis on
security will be required. General awareness of security
issues become integral in corporate culture.
B. TRUSTED COMPUTER BASE (TCB)
The Department of Defense (DOD) has played a lead role in
the evolution of computer security. Six underlying
requirements have directed DOD efforts in secure computer
systems. They are identified (NCSC, 1985) as:
• Security policy. There must be an explicit and well-
defined security policy enforced by the system.
• Identification. Every subject must be uniquely and
convincingly identified. Identification is necessary so
that subject/object access request can be checked.
• Marking. Every object must be associated with a "label"
that indicates the security level of the object. The
association, which is also known as "marking" the object,
must be done so that the label is available for comparison
each time an access to the object is requested.
• Accountability. The system must maintain complete, secure
records of actions that affect security. Such actions
include introduction of new users to the system,
assignment or change of the security level of a subject or
an object, and denied access attempts.
• Assurance. The computing system must contain mechanisms
that enforce security, and it must be possible to evaluate
the effectiveness of these mechanisms.
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Continuous protection. The mechanism that implement
security must be protected against unauthorized change.
Based on these six requirements, the DOD has developed a
set of theoretically based standards. They define levels of
information security in terms of function and assurance.
These standards are published in the document called Trusted
Computer System Evaluation Criteria, TCSEC, otherwise known as
"The Orange Book" (DOD-5200. 28-STD) . (Lorin, 1988) The level
of trust required by specific system environments is described
in the "Computer Security Requirements -- Guide for Applying
the DOD TCSEC in Specific Environments" (CSC-STD-003-85)
.
The private sector has become more concerned as a result
of increased instances of computer intrusion. As the DOD, the
private sector has become increasingly dependent on
information processing assets. Any increase in dependency on
any particular asset increases the potential impact of that
asset being attacked. It has also been pressured by the
government for the concern that private-sector data represents
a national resource. Fifteen factors driving the civilian
computer security market are identified by Wood (1990) . They
are:
• Media attention.
• External auditor comments.
• Insurance premium rating.




• Government laws and regulations.
• Military research.
• Elastic demand curve.
• New technologies outstrip controls.
• System interconnection.
• System integration.




Most large general purpose information systems, including
distributed systems, support multiple subjects (users)
accessing multiple levels of object (data) classification.
Strict limits on users access rights must be defined.
Further, there must be no method for violating these limits.
(Lorin, 1988)
The alternative to multi-subject, multi-level object
systems is the employment of dedicated systems for each level
of information classification. The premise of this scheme is
physical isolation to improve information security. This
scheme becomes unmanageable for large systems where it would
result in the proliferation individual systems and associated
assets. While the information held on any one system may be
more secure, the overall organization is less secure because
67
larger populations must be trusted. The interconnection of
computers makes the concept of physical security at a single
system inadequate to address the security issue. (Lorin, 1988)
Some researchers extending TCSEC to trusted distributed
systems maintain that there is little intrinsic difference in
the assurances required from a trusted stand-alone system. In
each case, access control policy dictates all allowed access
between each subject and each object on the system. Formal
verification is used to provide assurance about system
compliance to the access control policy (Schaefer, 1985)
.
Other researchers feel that a disproportionate amount of
effort is placed in ensuring access control of classified data
while not properly addressing information integrity. (Clark
and Wilson, 1990)
TCSEC has been formally extended to distributed systems by
the DOD National Computer Security Center (NCSC) . The ensuing
document is called Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI)
,
otherwise known as "The Red Book". TNI uses the term network
to represent all types of distributed systems. Accreditation
is the managerial authorization to operate a system which has
been proven to be in compliance with TCSEC requirements. TNI
recognizes two means of accrediting networks. Systems can be
viewed as a collection of independent nodes which are created,
managed, and accredited through a joint approval process.
Alternatively, a network can be treated as a single system and
accredited as a single entity. (Lance, 1990)
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Through interpreting the TCSEC for networks, TNI contains
all of the criteria in the TCSEC and adds rationale to
applying trust technology to network systems. As with TCSEC
itself, the interpretation has been prepared to provide
guidance over three areas. As listed in the TNI they are:
• To provide a standard to manufacturers as to what security
features and assurance levels to build into their new and
planned, commercial network products in order to provide
widely available systems that satisfy trusted reguirements
for sensitive applications.
• To provide a metric by which to evaluate the degree of
trust that can be placed in a given network system for
processing sensitive information.
• To provide a basis for specifying security reguirements in
acquisition specifications.
TNI is presented in two parts. Part I is the direct
interpretation of TCSEC for network systems. The specific
security features, assurance requirements, and the rating
structure of the TCSEC are extended to networks of computers
ranging from isolated local area networks to wide-area
internetwork systems. The primary emphasis of Part I, as
TCSEC, is controlling access to information.
The procedure for determining the minimum security
requirements for a network parallels the procedure for a
stand-alone system. The procedure for computing the risk index
contains six major steps (DODD 5200.28 Enclosure (4)). These
steps are listed as:
1. Determine system security mode of operation.
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2. Determine minimum user clearance or authorization rating.
3. Determine maximum data sensitivity rating.
4. Determine risk index.
5. Determine minimum security evaluation class for computer-
based controls.
6. Determine adjustments to computer security evaluation
class required.
The risk index is used to determine which NCSC-evaluation
ratings is required of the system to provide adequate security
as minimum requirements.
TNI Part II contains additional network security concerns
such as communications integrity, denial of service, and
transmission security. TNI Part I does not describe all the
security requirements that may be imposed on a network.
Depending upon the particular environment, other measures may
be required. Examples of the functionality of security
services are (NCSC, 1990)
:
• Authentication.
• Communications field integrity.
• Non-repudiation.
• Denial of service.
• Protocol based DOS protection.
• Network management.
• Data confidentiality.
• Traffic flow confidentiality.
• Selective routing.
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These concerns differentiate the network environment from
the stand-alone computer. Some concerns take on increased
significance in the network environment while others do not
exist on stand-alone computers. Many are outside the scope of
Part I or lack theoretical and formal analysis. The criteria
in this Part II addresses these concerns as additional
security requirements that may vary among applications.
TNI Part II security requirements describe qualitative
evaluations of security services in terms of functionality,
strength of mechanism, and assurance. The fact that Part II
services have not been supported by equally well developed
theories and detailed evaluation criteria should not be
interpreted to imply that their security problems do not have
to be evaluated as rigorously as TNI Part I.
The Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) Environments
Guide (TNIEG) addresses many issues needed to achieve the
level of trust required in different network environments. It
complements the TNI, just as the Trusted Computer System
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) Environments Guide complements the
TCSEC. It is an evolving document which advances as
technology and experience is gained in implementing trusted
networks. This document applies to networks that are
entrusted with the processing of information, regardless of
whether that information is classified, sensitive, or
otherwise relevant to national security.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The primary research focus was on identifying aspects of
computer security unique to distributed systems. This study
was designed to help managers gain an appreciation for
security issues faced in distributed environments. Security
goals related to distributed systems were identified in
Chapter I. These goals were derived from a wide range of
literature sources. These must be combined with other
objectives applicable to stand-alone systems to achieve an
overall security plan.
It is interesting to note strong similarity between the
security goals listed in Chapter I and goals of the highly
formalized TCSEC security program. It is also interesting to
compare the impact of organizational culture on the
implementation of security programs. Vast differences are
seen in the actual security programs stemming from similar
goals.
Characteristics of distributed systems are and why they
differ from stand-alone systems were introduced in Chapter II.
The differences were the underlying causes of the security
goals posed in Chapter I.
Chapter III assisted in identifying system assets. A list
of possible assets is provided in Appendix A. It also
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discussed the nature of threats to systems which possess
characteristics associated with distributed systems. Chapter
IV covered a broad scope of countermeasures which may be used
to protect distributed systems. It provides the basic tools
used in securing distributed processing. Again, this was not
a complete list, but rather focused on those countermeasures
applicable to distributed systems.
The general mechanism to secure distributed systems was
outlined in Chapter V. This approach involved risk management
and developing a security plan. There is no optimal solution
to designing a security system for a distributed system. The
level of security depends on the perceived threats and the
risks in a particular environment. The environment faces by
distributed systems can be much more diverse than stand-alone
systems. Risk assessment is required to evaluate and select
security measures. Yet the impact of these controls must be
considered against the objectives and operating practices of
the organization. A balance must be established between tight
controls which may adversely impact operations of the
organization against loose controls which result in security
problems. As an example of a security program, the DOD's
highly structured and theoretically researched TCSEC is
presented for evaluation.
Regardless of the complexity of the network environment,
security remains a management issue, not a technological one.
Prudent management, therefore, will take advantage of the
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knowledge that the potential for loss in a network environment
is greater that in any other. They must implement a security
plan in advance of installing a distributed system and review
the specific controls as the system expands. It is a matter
for management to design a security plan that applies to their
unique organization. Management must then emphasize the need
to abide by their plan throughout the organization, and follow
it up to ensure that the plan is invoked as prescribed.
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APPENDIX B (MAGNETIC MEDIA CONTROL)
Media marking
• Marked to accurately reflect the sensitivity of the
information. Marking may be performed manually or
automatically.
• Label storage media to reflect:
- The sensitivity level of the information they
contain.
- Date of creation and destruction.
- Unique identification number.
- Creator or user.
• Color coding. Color coding of magnetic media or
components shall comply with standard color codes for
classified material.
Storage
• Media and containers. Media and containers should be
marked/protected to the highest security classification
level or most restrictive category of information stored
on media until the media is declassified
( d e g a u s s e d / e r a s ed ) or the information
declassified/downgraded.
• Inventory Control.
• Access Control. Physical access to media in storage is
often overlooked. A strong tendency is to protect the
system while not providing equal measures for
backup/stored data.
Destruction
• Destroy storage media in accordance with the
organization's security provisions.
• Educate users to the proper methods for erasing or
destroying storage media.
• Degaussing. Demagnetizing magnetic storage media




• Clearing vs. Declassification.
- Clearing procedure. Accomplished by the overwrite
of classified or sensitive material. Since the
totality of declassification is lacking, cleared
medial should not be released to subjects lacking
access rights to the original material.
- Declassification procedure. Accomplished by the
obliteration of classified or sensitive material.
Proper inventory control records will denote
declassification events. The declassified media is
releasable without restriction.
• Emergency destruction. Addressed as policy in risk
management and contingency planning programs for the
intentional mass destruction of media and other material
which are classified or sensitive.
Media security
• Protect and secure information system storage media.
• Maintain, control, and audit storage media inventories.
• Password protection.
• Removable media.
- Encourage use of removable, securable data storage
systems.
- Avoid fixed hard disks, especially if the system is
used for classified applications.
• Control of printer ribbon. Control at the highest level
of information printed. The ribbon should be retained in
printer for life-cycle if physical controls permit.
Accountability
• Publicize procedures and policies to staff.
• Ensure that access for storing, transmitting, marking,
handling, and destroying storage medial is granted only to
authorized persons.
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- Critical Processing Lists
- Application Backup
- Support agreement (s)
• Emergency Actions
- Minimize the impact
Protect life and property
Minimize disruption to information system operation
- Backup operations
- Develop backup procedures
- Maintain backup copies of application programs data
files, and supporting documentation.
• Recovery operations
Develop plans to permit rapid restoration of
information system facility operations
• Perform reguired periodic testing
• Contingency Plan testing
- Not always time for response to read procedures
- Most critical aspect of successful planning
- Conduct freguent tests to maintain readiness
- Minimally, plans will be tested once annually
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